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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
JACK ALDON HEWITT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
THE GENERAL TIRE AND
RUBBER COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No. 8502

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the Statment of Facts
set forth in Appellant's Brief.
STATEMENT OF POINT UPON WHICH
RESPONDENT RELIES
The appellant is not entitled to interest on the
verdict returned by the jury on April 23, 1953, until
paid.
ARGUMENT
At the conclusion of the evidence at the trial
of the above-entitled cause, defendant moved for a
directed verdict. The motion was not immediately
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ruled upon but was withheld pending the jury's
verdict. The verdict was for the plaintiff, whereupon
defendant moved for judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict, which motion was granted.
The mere fact that the clerk entered a judgment on
the verdict before the court had ruled on the motion
for a directed verdict and before the court granted
the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict could, of course, be of no avail to the plaintiff.
The clerk, performing a ministerial act, could give
no validity to the verdict during the period that the
court had reserved its ruling-that is, while it had
the defendant's motion under advisement - nor
could the clerk's judgment be of any validity as
against the ruling of the court giving judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
Now the real question is: From what date
was the plaintiff entitled to interest upon the judgment which the Supreme Court, in reversing the
trial court, ordered to be entered on the verdict?
Plaintiff claims he should receive interest from the
date of the verdict while defendant contends that it
is the date the judgn1ent in favor of the plaintiff
was actually entered from which interest should
be computed.
Counsel for plaintiff considers the question
settled by Rule 54-E of the Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides:
2
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" (e) The clerk must include in any
judgment signed by him any interest on the
verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been
taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, within
two days after the costs have been taxed or
ascertained, in any case where not included
in the judgment, insert the amount thereof
in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in
the Register of Actions and in the Judgment
Docket.''
It will be noted that this rule directs the clerk
to include in any judgment signed by him "interest
on the verdict or decision from the time it was
rendered". This rule flies in the face of our statute,
Section 15-1-4, which provides:
"Any judgment rendered on a lawful
contract shall conform thereto and shall bear
the interest agreed upon by the parties, which
shall be specified in the judgment; other judgments shall bear interest at the rate of eight
per cent per ann urn.''
As the statute provides that "other judgments
shall bear interest at the rate of B7o per annum"
there can be no interest for a judgment to bear until
the judgment is entered. The Enabling Act for the
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the rules
"may not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive
rights of any litigant", and Rule 54-E, which attempts to authorize the clerk to "include in any
judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict
3
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or decision from the time it was rendered" is an
enlargement of the rights of the plaintiff and is
to that extent a nullity.
Counsel cites a number of cases which he claims
justify his contention that interest should be computed from the date of the verdict, but when examined none of them support him. In Bond v. United
States Railroad (Cal.) (Pltfs. Br. P. 3) 113 P.2d
366 the statute expressly directs that "the clerk
must include in the judgment entered up by him
any interest on the verdict or decision of the court
from the date it was rendered". This is the same
provision contained in our Rule 54-E and the case is
not authority for the construction of our statute.
The same is true of the other California cases cited
at PP-4-5 of plaintiff's brief. In the case of Metcalf
v. City of Watertown, 68 F. 859, (Applts. Br. P. 6)
a Wisconsin statue provided for interest from the
date of the verdict. In Louisiana and Arkansas Ratlway Company v. Pratt, 142 F. 2d 847 (Applts. Br.
P. 6) the court held it was proper to allow interest
from the date of the verdict because Section 966
Revised Statute authorized it to be done. In Givens
v. Missouri-Kansas etc. Railroad, 196 F. 2d 905
( Applts. Br. PP-8-9) the court expressly relies on
the case of Louisiana et. Railway Co. v. Pratt and
allows interest from the date of the verdict presumably for the same reason given by the court in that
4
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case, and in Wright v. Paramount Richards Theaters,
Inc., 198 F. 2d 303 (Applts. Br. P. 11) the Givens
case is relied on as authority. These Federal cases
therefore are really based upon Section 966 which
authorizes the computation of interest from the date
of the verdict. The last case cited by counsel, Y arno
v. Hedlund, etc. Co. (Cal.) 237 P. 1002 (Applts. Br.
P. 12) is not authority in this case because, as before
stated, the California statute expressly directs that
interest be computed from the date of the verdict.
Let us now call the court's attention to authorities that are in point. As before stated, Utah has no
statute which allows interest from the date of the
verdict in a personal injury case, and Rule 54-E,
cannot confer a right to interest from that date.
The statute controls the rule and interest can only
be computed from the date of the judgment.
The allowance of interest is purely a statutory
matter. It can make no difference that there is a
delay between the date of the verdict and the date
of the entry of the judgment, for a defendant has
a right at all stages to contest the validity or amount
of the verdict, and the mere fact that the plaintiff is
unable to collect the amount of his verdict because
of proceedings on appeal or otherwise, does not confer upon him any right to claim interest from the
date the verdict is rendered, and this is especially
5
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true when the verdict is set aside, or its effectiveness suspended, as in this case. Here there was
neither verdict nor judgment for the plaintiff until
the Supreme Court reinstated the verdict and ordered judgment thereon. This question of the right
to interest has been before many courts and it has
been repeatedly held that where the statute does
not expressly allow interest to be computed from
the date of the verdict, interest is not allowable from
such date.
"Where plaintiff recovers a verdict for
slander and a motion for new trial was not
disposed of until the following term, when it
was overruled and judgment entered on the
verdict; held : the trial court erred in adding
interest from the date of the verdict to the
date of the judgment since the recovery was
not on a claim bearing interest and there was
no statutory authority for interest on verdicts.''
Blickenstaff v. Perrin, 27 Ind. 527; Atherton
v.Fowler, 46 Calif. 320; Clyde Mill and Elevator Co.
v. Buoy (Kansas) 80 P. 591; Baltimore City etc. R.R.
Co. v. Sewell, 37 Md. 443; Kelsey v. Murphy, 30 Pa.
340.
In every one of the above states in which said
decisions were rendered, a later statute was passed
directing the computation of interest from the date
of the verdict and there are therefore a number of
cases from each of said states wherein interest from
such date was allowed, based upon said statute.
6
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The reasons for the disallowance of interest
from the date of the verdict, in the absence of a
statute, are well stated in the note to I ALR (2),
Page 493:
"In Baltimore City Pass. R. Co. v. Sewell
( 1873) 37 Md. 443, after a verdict for the
plaintiff, the defendant filed motions for a
new trial and in arrest of judgment which
were subsequently overruled, and on appeal
the overruling of the motions was affirmed.
On remand, the trial court, on motion of the
plaintiff, entered judgment for the amount
of the verdict with interest from the date of
the verdict, and the defendant appealed, contending that interest could run only from the
date of the judgment. After reviewing the
common-law principles and previous decisions
the court said: 'The verdict being an intermediate step in the progress of litigation,
liable to be suspended or annulled by the subsequent action of the Court, it does not seem
to us consistent with judicial deliberation that
the delay occasioned by motions for a new
trial, or in arrest of judgment (although such
motions should be ultimately overruled)
should be made the occasion of an increase of
damages, by way of interest, on the presumption that such motions were groundless, and
without cause. The motion for a new trial, or
in arrest, is a valuable and necessary incident
to the right of trial by jury, and no restraint
should be placed upon it inconsistent with
its freest exercise. The Court cannot assume
that in the exercise of a legal right, any party
to a cause is actuated by sinister motives.'
The judgment was reversed ,as to the interest
7
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accruing between the date of the verdict and
entry of the judgment, and the cause remanded for modification in that respect. (But see
Hodgson v. Phippin ( 1930) 159 Md. 97, 150
A. 118, infra, Sec. 10, decided under a later
statute expressly authorizing interest from
date of verdict.)
"In reversing an order of the trial court
allowing interest from the date of the verdict
after affirmance of a judgment for the plaintiff, entry of which had been delayed some
eleven months by pendency of the defendant's
motions in arrest of judgment and for a new
trial, in Kelsey v. Murphy (1858) 30 Pa. 340,
the court stated that from the definitions of
interest, differing but little in essentials, two
things must necessarily pre-exist to raise the
duty on the part of the debtor to discharge
his debt, namely, the ascertainment of the
amount to be paid, and its maturity. The court
then said: 'If these essentials are wanting, the
debt, although existing, cannot be said to be
due and withheld, and the duty to pay has not
become imperative upon the debtor. Unliquidated demands, past due, will, if otherwise
entitled, bear interest, upon the maxim of id
certum est quod certum reddi potest. They
can be rendered certain. But while the question of indebtedness, under all the ascertained
facts in the case is under consideration in the
courts, as is the case on a motion for a new
trial, the con tract of the debtor is suspended.
The case is in gremio legis, and is presumed
to be held under consideration by the ministers of the law. The debtor can neither pay,
nor tender, so as to avail anything, even if
disposed to abandon the contest. It is em8
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phatically, and intruth, the 'law's delay' ...
While, therefor, the very essence of the contest is being considered, and the result is in
dubio, it is easy to see, that no duty rests upon
the party ultimately liable to pay, as long as
that condition lasts, and of course he ought
not to be obliged to make com pen sation to the
opposite party, because it exists and continues
for a time. That the proceeding is still immature, when a verdict is rendered, is apparent, when we consider that it is in a condition on which no process can issue, and on
which no action can be maintained, and is
no lien on either real or personal estate. For
these and other reasons, neither the common
law of England, nor the practice there, or
with us, have sanctioned the collection of interest as incidental to a verdict during the
pendency of a motion for a new trial.
"In Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v.
Berry ( 1895) 55 Kan. 186, 40 P. 288, the
trial court, refusing to receive and enter the
jury's general verdict for the plaintiff, directed a general verdict for the defendant
upon which it entered judgment. The judgment was reversed on appeal and the cause
remanded with directions that judgment be
entered for the plaintiff for the amount of the
verdict, and in entering judgment on the supreme court's mandate, the trial court added
interest from the date of the return of the
verdict. In modifying the judgment so as to
eliminate the interest prior to the entry of
judgment, the supreme court observed that
while interest on verdicts was expressly allowed by statute in some states it was not in
Kansas, and that it was unnecessary to de9
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cide whether a verdict bore interest from the
time of its rendition, holding that since the
verdict was not recognized or received by the
trial court until it was done in obedience to the
mandate of the supreme court, the verdict was
then for the first time given force and vitality.
"And in Clyde Mill. & Elev. Co. v. Buoy
( 1905) 71 Kan. 293, 80 P. 591, wherein, after
having obtained a verdict, the plaintiff appealed from an order of the trial court granting the defendant a new trial, and the order
of the trial court was reversed with direction
to enter judgment on the findings and verdict,
and the trial court entered judgment including therein interest on the amount of the verdict up to the date of the judgment, from
which action the defendant appealed, it was
held that the allowance of interest upon the
amount awarded by the verdict from its date
to the entry of judgment was not authorized
by the statute (Sec. 3590, General Statutes
1901) regulating matters of interest.
"But for Kansas cases under a later
statute, see infra, Sec. 11.
"It was held in Campbell v. Elkins
(1905) 58 W.Va. 308, 52 SE 220, 2 LRA NS
159, that in a personal injury action wherein
a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff the
subsequent rendition of judgment for the
amount thereof with interest from the date
of the verdict was in strict obedience to the
mandate of the statute (Code 1899, c 131,
Sec. 16) . The court stated: 'Prior to the Acts
of 1882, Chapter 120, amending certain sections of the Code, including sections 14 and
16, this would have been error . . ."
10
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"In Easter v. Virginian R. Co. ( 1915)
76 W. Va. 383, 86 SE 37, a personal injury
action, in reversing a judgment of the trial
court entered on a verdict previously rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and allowing interest
from the date of the verdict, it was held that
in tort actions interest runs only from the
date of the judgment under the statute (Sec.
18, c 131, Code of 1913, Sec. 4927) providingthat every judgment or decree for the payment of money, except where it is otherwise
provided by law, should bear interest from the
date thereof, whether or not it is so stated
in the judgment or decree. The court stated
that Sec. 14 (Sec. 4923) of the same chapter
authorizes a judgment for interest from the
date of the verdict only in case of actions
founded on contract, and that, the judgment
in the present case being for a tort, there was
no authority in law for giving judgment for
interest, except from the date of the judgment."
In Hazel E. Briggs, Admrx. etc., of Ralph
Briggs, deceased v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company,
Appt. 154 F (2) 21, the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit had before it a statute which provides that interest be caluclated "from
the date of judgment". The facts of that case as
outlined in the opinion of the court were:
" . . . During the trial a motion to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction was made
by the defendant. The court reserved decision
on the motion and submitted the cause to the
jury, which, on February 15, 1945, returned
11
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a plain tiff's verdict. The motion to dismiss
was granted, however, on April19, 1945, and
judgment for the defendant was duly entered.
We reversed that judgment on January 7,
1946, and by mandate of January 23, 1946,
directed that judgment on the verdict for the
plaintiff be entered. We neither did, nor were
we requested to, give any directions as to interest. On January 28, 1946, the judgment
on our mandate was entered for the amount
of the verdict and for interest from the date
of the verdict as above stated."
The court then went on to hold:
"The remaining question is whether interest should be allowed from the date the
judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict
would, in the absence of error in decision,
have been entered, viz., the date when the original judgment for the defendant was entered by the order of the court; or from J anuary 28, 1946, the date when judgment for
the plaintiff was actually entered after our
mandate went down. And if the latter date
is the correct one, we must decide whether
we now have any power to amend that mandate to make the judgment date nunc pro
tunc that of the original judgment and, if
so, whether that power ought to be exercised.
"It is true that subsequent events have
shown that on the date of the original judgment the plaintiff was entitled to have a
judgment entered on the verdict and this
judgment would have borne interest until it
was paid. But from a practical standpoint,
it is equally true that the plaintiff then was
'entitled' only to have the trial judge decide
12
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the pending motions and direct the entry of
such judgment as he fairly determined to be
lawful and just. That is exactly what the trial
judge did. Thereafter the plaintiff was 'entitled' only to take whatever action by way of
appellate review the law afforded her. The
delay in the entry of the proper judgment was
necessary in the sense that time for appellate
review was required; it was only after the
ordinary appellate proceedings had been, completed that the plaintiff's cause of action had
reached the point where her right to a judgment on the verdict was judicially established.
That judgment was then promptly entered.
The date of its entry became the judgment
date from which interest is to be computed
under the statute. It was, under the circumstances, the first day when the judgment could
have been entered."
Although the case involved the question of
whether interest should run on the verdict of the
jury, the reasoning in a Washington case, Kiessling
v. North West Greyhound Lines, 229 P2 335, is applicable here.
"The verdict of the jury was returned
May 13, 1950. Judgment on the verdict was
entered July 7, 1950. The court allowed interest on the amount of the verdict from its
rendition to the entry of judgment. There is
no statute in this state providing for the
accrual of interest from the date of a verdict.
Rem. Rev. Stat. Sec. 457 provides for intrest
on judgments from the date of entry thereof.
It is argued that inasmuch as a demand becomes liquidated when a verdict is returned,
the rule that interest commences to run from
13
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that time should be applied; also, because
verdict when entered upon the execution docket as required by Rem. Rev. Stat. Sec. 431-1,
is in effect a lien upon real property, it must
follow that interest commences to run from
the date of verdict. However, in the cases of
Rood v. Horton, 132 Wash. 82, 231 P. 450
(Verdict of the jury) and Phifer v. Burton,
141 Wash. 186, 251 P. 127 (Award by the
Court) it was decided that interest ran from
the date of the judgment only. The theory.
upon which the decisions were based was that
the demands had not become liquidated until
the verdict of the jury or award made by the
court had become merged in the judgment
thereafter entered. The verdict of a jury or a
pronouncement of the court determines and
fixes a definite amount of recovery, but the
demand is not fully liquidated until the entry
of judgment for the reason that the court may
grant a new trial because the award is excessive or insufficient; or may raise or lower
the amount and afford the party adversely
affected the option to accept the same or submit to a new trial of the case, or, in the case
of an award by the court, the trial judge
may change his mind and make a different
award than included in the original pronouncement. We think the principle involved
has been settled by Buob v. Frenaughty Machinery Company, 4 Wash. (2) 276, 300, 103
P ( 2) 325. The case involved a claim for unliquidated damages. The court made an award
of damages, but on appeal the case was remanded for further consideration. On the
second hearing the amount of the damages
was determined but the court did not make
any findings or conclusions. Subsequently,
14
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findings and conclusions were made and the
judgment entered thereon, which was the
third judgment in the case. We held that interest commenced to run from the date of
the last judgment because until that time the
amount of damages had never become liquidated. This subject is discussed in the Annotation in 1 A.L.R. ( 2) 492. The author cites
a number of cases holding that in the absence
of a statute, interest runs from the date of
entry of judgment, and not from the date of
rendition of verdict. The author also points
out that after several of the cases were so
decided, the legislatures of the respective
states enacted statutes providing for interest
from the rendition of the verdict. We are of
the opinion that the court erred in entering
in the judgment interest from the rendition
of the verdict, which should have allowed
interest only from the date of judgment."
In Mundy v. Millsap (Tenn.) 271 S.W. (2)
857, where a judgment was entered on March 21,
1952, a motion for a new trial filed on April 3rd
and the motion overruled on September 6th except
that a remittitur in the amount of $19.00 was ordered, it was held that interest ran from September
6, the date of judgment was filed after overruling
the motion for a new trial.
In State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Koffenberger, 83 NE (2f 916 (Ohio), the court
entered a nunc pro tunc judgment to carry interest
from the date of the verdict. The appellate court
held:
15
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"Date from which interest on judgment
was allowable was controlled by statute, and
under that interest was allowable only from
the date of judgment rather than from the
date of verdict, so that nunc pro tunc entry
ordering judgment to carry interest from the
date of the verdict was improper."
See also the Ohio case of Sewar v. Schmidt, 49
N.E. (2) 696.
"Schullin v. Wabash Railway Company
(1905) 192 Mo. S.W. 1028, the trial court's
order setting aside a verdict and judgment
rendered the same day and granting the defendant a new trial was reversed on appeal
and the case was remanded with directions
to set aside the order granting a new trial
and to enter judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with the verdict. The plaintiff then
moved to set aside the judgment so entered
and to enter judgment as of the date of the
verdict, such motion being overruled, the
plaintiff appealed, contending that judgment
should have been entered as of the date when
the verdict and original judgment were rendered or that the judgment entered pursuant
to the mandate should have been for the
amount of the verdict together with interest
from the date of the verdict ... Pointing out
that under the statute, all judgments bore
interest from the time of their rendition unless otherwise provided in the judgment, the
court reasoned that from the time the verdict
and judgment was rendered and the motion
to set it aside sustained, it was suspended and
so remained until judgment was subsequently
entered pursuant to the Supreme Court man16
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date, and during the interval there really was
no judgment in favor of the plaintiff which
could be enforced, for the reason that the
one which had been rendered in the first instance had been set aside. The court further
reasoned that if the plaintiff had submitted
to the ruling of the trial court when it sustained the defendant's motion for a new trial
and had the case been tried over again, he
would have had no claim to interest on the
first judgment in the event of his recovery
of another verdict, for the reason that it had
been set aside. The court accordingly held
that upon reversal of the judgment and the
remanding of the case with directions to set
aside the order granting a new trial and enter
judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with
the verdict, in the absence of further order
to enter judgment as of the date of rendition
of the verdict and original judgment, or to
enter it for the amount of the verdict with
interest from the date of rendition, the only
thing the trial court could do, in acting in
accordance with the mandate of the Supreme
Court, was to enter judgment for the plaintiff
only for the amount of the verdict."
CONCLUSION
These cases holding that where a verdict or
judgment has been set aside, interest does not commence to run until the order setting it aside has
been reversed and the verdict and judgment reinstated, are not only logical, but fair. They are logical because when a judgment or verdict is set aside,
there is in reality no judgment which can draw in17
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terest. They are fair because any other holding
would penalize the party for relying on the judgment of the trial court and would impose upon him
the risk of the appellate court reversing the trial
court and then if the trial court was reversed of
paying the amount of a verdict and being subjected
to liability for interest because he saw fit to support
the trial court's decision.
It might also be said that to allow interest at
this point is to make the substantive rights of the
party depend upon the procedure the court adopts.
To illustrate, the motion for a directed verdict in
this case was made prior to the time that the case
was submitted to the jury. Had the court granted
the motion at that time, there could be no question
whatsoever that no interest would be due for the
reason that there would have been no verdict and
no judgment entered on a verdict. The court, however, as authorized by the Rules of Civil Procedure,
took the motion under advisement and in effect,
granted it after the rendition of the verdict. It is
submitted that the ruling of the District Court
should have related back to the time that the motion
for a directed verdict was made and restored the
case to that status of no verdict and therefore no
judgment, as far as the question of interest is concerned. Otherwise, a litigant would be placed in the
position that interest would run when the court
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took the motion under advisement and let the matter
go to the jury, thereafter setting it aside, but would
not run when the judge granted the motion prior to
submitting the case to the jury and thereby prevented the rendition of any verdict.
Respondent respectfully concludes that appellant is not entitled to interest on the verdict entered
April 23, 1953, until paid, and that the order of
the District Court should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON AND BALDWIN

Attorneys for
Defendant and Respondent
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